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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DUE PROCESS-RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL-PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-TRIAL IN PRISON GARB

-FAILURE

TO OBJECT-The Supreme Court of the

United States

has held that although compelling a defendant to stand trial in

prison clothing would unconstitutionally deny him a fair trial, the
defendant's failure to make a timely objection, for whatever reason,
is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
In November, 1970, Harry Lee Williams was tried in Harris

County, Texas, for assault with intent to kill.1 Unable to post bond,
Williams was held in custody while awaiting trial. Before being
taken to trial, he asked an officer at the jail for his civilian clothes.
His request was denied. Neither Williams nor his counsel raised an
objection to Williams' appearance at trial in prison garb.' In light
of his past experience and knowledge of the customary practice in
Harris County, Williams' counsel had determined that such a motion would be futile.' The jury returned a verdict of guilty and
Williams was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment.
On appeal, Williams contended that being tried in jail clothes
denied him due process of law since it infringed his fundamental
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.' The Texas Court
1. The charges stemmed from a knifing incident in which Williams inflicted severe
wounds on his ex-landlord. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd
sub nom. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds and
vacated, 425 U.S. 501, aff'g district court on remand, 537 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1976).
2. 425 U.S. at 502. There was no dispute that Williams' clothing was immediately recognizable as prison garb. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 207 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974). He appeared
at trial wearing a white T-shirt with "Harris County Jail" stenciled across the back, oversized
white dungareds with the same stencil down the legs, and shower thongs. See 425 U.S. at 515
n.1.
3. At the evidentiary hearing Williams' counsel stated it was his belief that all non-bailed
defendants were tried in prison clothes. He also testified that his failure to object was due to
the fact a similar objection had been denied by another Harris County judge. He was unaware
of the particular trial judge's practice of permitting defendants to stand trial in civilian
clothes when such a request was made. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
4. Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Williams also contended that
he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 27. The Supreme Court did not
address this issue in Estelle. The dissent found the Court's failure to do so incongruous in
light of its finding that the right to be tried in civilian clothing could be waived by counsel
and counsel's decision was binding on the accused. 425 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of Criminal Appeals rejected his contention and affirmed the conviction. 5 Williams then petitioned the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas for a writ of habeas corpus.' After
an evidentiary hearing, the court found that in view of the common
practice in Harris County of trying defendants in jail clothes, and
the fact that the defendant asked to wear his civilian clothes, his
failure to object at trial did not constitute a waiver of the right to
be tried in civilian clothing.7 The district court further concluded
that in light of the strength of the evidence against Williams the
error was harmless. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with
the district court on the waiver issue but nonetheless reversed. In
its view, the error was not harmless The Supreme Court disagreed
with both courts on the waiver issue and reversed the circuit court;
Williams' failure to object to being tried in prison clothes was
"sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation."' 10
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, acknowledged
that the presumption of innocence is a basic component of the right
to a fair trial." Trying an accused in identifiable prison attire would
be a constant reminder to the jury of the accused's inmate status
and may affect its judgment, thus presenting an unacceptable risk
5. The state court found that "[aibsent an objection, it is presumed that he was willing
to go to trial in jail clothing." 477 S.W.2d at 26.
6. The petition was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which provides that a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus where the applicant
establishes that he did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in a state court or was
otherwise denied due process of law.
7. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp'. 335 (S.D. Tex. 1973). The district court stated:
[Elvidence points to the strong likelihood that the trial climate at that time acted
as a natural deterrent to the raising of objections to what was commonplace-a trial
in jail clothes, even assuming that defendants or their counsel thought about the
problem and considered its legal implications. In the absence of such consideration it
can scarcely be concluded that either petitioner in this case or his trial counsel knowingly, willingly and voluntarily waived the right to be tried in civilian clothing.
Id. at 343.
8. Id.
9. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974). The court found the evidence of malice
and intent to kill insufficient to sustain the conviction, and all evidence taken into account
was not so strong "as to warrant the conclusion that the constitutional error of trying Williams
in prison garb was harmless." Id. at 211-12.
10. 425 U.S. at 513.
11. Id. at 503. "[The presumption of innocence] is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law." Id. at 503, citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
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to the presumption of innocence. 2 The Court refused, however, to
adopt a per se rule invalidating all convictions where a defendant
appears in prison garb. Chief Justice Burger focused instead on
compulsion as the standard for determination of a constitutional
violation; if a defendant were compelled to wear his prison clothes
before the jury, fourteenth amendment due process standards would
be violated. 3
Since the defendant's counsel was conscious of the prison garb
issue 4 and knew that he could have objected, and because the particular judge presiding over Williams' case had a policy of permitting defendants to appear in civilian clothes, 5 Chief Justice Burger
concluded that Williams was in no way compelled to stand trial in
his prison attire.' The Court was not persuaded that an objection
would have been futile despite the fact the general practice in Harris
County was to try non-bailed defendants in prison garb. There being
no evidence that such an objection would have been prejudicial to
the defendant, the Court reasoned that to reverse the conviction
when this practice was not compelled would permit defense counsel
to use prison attire to elicit juror sympathy at the trial while at the
same time preserving the clothing issue as a basis for an appeal if
his client were convicted. 7
Although the Court's opinion avoided terming Williams' failure
to object a waiver, he was effectively foreclosed from later raising
the issue of his appearance at trial. In the Chief Justice's view, the
Court was not confronted with the relinquishment of a fundamental
right of the type presented in Johnson v. Zerbst,'s where the issue
was waiver of the right to counsel. Thus, the knowing and intelligent
waiver test enunciated there need not be applied. The decision to
object to trial in prison garb was instead determined to be a tactical,
trial-type right, which rendered an exacting waiver analysis unnecessary. 9 Whereas compelling an accused to stand trial before a jury
12. 425 U.S. at 505. Unlike the case where physical restraints are necessary, forcing an
accused to wear prison clothes furthers no state interest. See note 31 infra.
13. 425 U.S. at 507.
14. Id. at 510.
15. See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
16. 425 U.S. at 512.
17. Id. at 508.
18. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (accused must intelligently and competently waive his constitutional right to counsel).
19. 425 U.S. at 508 n.3. Later in his opinion, Chief Justice Burger referred to Johnson as
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in prison garb violates due process, the failure to object, for whatever reason, was sufficient to negate any possible allegations of compulsion; therefore no constitutional violation had occurred."
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred. He identified two methods of waiving possible due process claims which
would permit upholding convictions despite the claimed infringement of a constitutional right. The first arises where the defendant
consensually relinquishes a substantive constitutional right. The
other occurs where the defendant makes an inexcusable procedural
default. Failure to make a timely objection at a time when an accused's rights could have been protected would be an inexcusable
default amounting to a waiver. In Justice Powell's view, Williams'
actions constituted such a default. His failure to object, which
might be interpreted as a strategic choice involving a trial-type
right, should operate as a matter of federal law to preclude him
from subsequently raising the substantive right.2
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall concurred. He challenged the appropriateness of defining a
material right which affects the accuracy of the fact-finding process
in terms of compulsion. 2 He argued that the voluntary and knowing
waiver test enunciated in Johnson must be applied in this situation;
to delineate the defendant's rights in terms of compulsion results in
imputing waiver whenever a defendant could object to a particular
procedure but remains silent. 3 The Court's compulsion standard
would eviscerate the traditional doctrine that loss of such fundamental rights cannot be presumed from inaction,24 and would introimposing a "burden" on trial judges who must take steps to insure that an accused was
deliberately waiving a particular right. Id. at 512.
20. Id. at 512-13.
21. Id. at 515 n.4 (concurring opinion). Justice Powell construed the right to be tried in
civilian attire as a trial-type right in which an attorney's conduct may bind his client. He
relied on Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), where the Court found that a defense
counsel's choice not to object to tainted evidence amounted to a waiver binding on the
defendant. The evidence had suggested that counsel's actions were part of a deliberate trial
strategy. Id. at 451. Cf. text accompanying notes 51-53 infro.
22. Justice Brennan observed: "[Tihe only area in which the concept of compulsion is
relevant to the definition of a substantive right is the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. . . . [D]ue process rights to a fair trial do not, however, depend on the
existence of state compulsion.'" 425 U.S. at 516 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id. at 516. Accord, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (the right to counsel does
not depend on whether defendant requested one, and to presume waiver from a silent record
is impermissible).
24. 425 U.S. at 523 (dissenting opinion). Justice Brennan declared that a basic tenent of
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duce a test for determining the surrender of basic due process protections which did not adequately safeguard those constitutional
rights.25
Although the Supreme Court had never before addressed the specific issue, lower courts considering the effect of appearing before a
jury in prison garb, and its impact on the presumption of innocence,
have determined that such a practice undermines the fairness of the
fact-finding process.2" One of the functions of the presumption is to
insure that in reaching its verdict, the jury will consider only evidence actually presented during trial. 7 The constant reminder of
the accused's incarceration may affect a juror's judgment," since
the sight of the defendant clad in prison attire conveys the impression that the defendant's position is not that of a peer.29 This could
result in a subtle inclination, if not an outright tendency, to be
predisposed to return the defendant to prison where he belongs. 31
The dilution of the presumption of innocence is difficult to justify,
Supreme Court jurisprudence has been that constitutional rights which affect the fairness of
the fact-finding process are not lost unless the state shows that a knowing and intelligent
waiver has taken place. Id. at 523 n.6. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), which involved
the right to a speedy trial, the Court summarized its standard for waiver of fundamental
rights: "[P]resuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction is inconsistent with this
Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights ....
Courts should 'indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' . . . and they should 'not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights.' " Id. at 525-26 (citations omitted). See Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292
(1937). The Barker Court cited both caseg. See also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962)
(presuming waiver of the right to counsel from a silent record is impermissible).
25. 425 U.S. at 516 (dissenting opinion).
26. See, e.g., Thomas v. Beto, 474 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 871 (1973);
Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Bentley v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1972);
Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 174 P.2d 717 (1946); Commonwealth v. Keeler, 216 Pa. Super.
Ct. 193, 264 A.2d 407 (1970). See also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL
BY JURY § 4.1(b), at 91 (1968), which states: "An incarcerated defendant or witness should
not be required to appear in court in the distinctive attire of a prisoner or convict."
Other courts have rejected any per se rule and have concluded that trial in jail uniform is
not inherently prejudicial. See Anderson v. Watt, 475 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1973); Watt v. Page,
452 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972); Xanthull v. Beto, 307 F. Supp.
903 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
27. See 24 VAND. L. REv. 412, 414 (1971), citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (1940 &
Supp. 1970).
28. See 425 U.S. at 505.
29. See id. at 518 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
30. Id. at 519. See also Commonwealth v. Keeler, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 193, 195, 264 A.2d
407, 409 (1970) (prejudical error occurred in prosecution for firearms violation when defendant
was ordered, over objection, to appear before jury in prison garb).
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especially in view of the Court's concession that it serves no legitimate state interest to try defendants in prison clothes.3 '
Although the Williams Court agreed with the majority of lower
courts that appearing in prison garb affects the fairness of the proceedings, 3 its decision to limit the scope of the constitutional violation to circumstances where the defendant was compelled to appear
before the jury in such clothes prevented the overturning of an otherwise valid conviction. The Court's emphasis on compulsion is not
as new as the dissent suggested, but it has heretofore been limited
to cases where the defendant's request at trial to be tried in civilian
clothes was expressly denied. 33 The difficulty with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Williams lies in its conclusion that this defendant was not compelled to wear prison garb merely because he made
no objection, although he felt, perhaps justifiably, he had no alternative than to be tried in prison attire. The Fifth Circuit had previously dealt with this precise problem in Hernandez v. Beto. 31
There, the defendant proceeded to trial in prison garb and made no
request to be tried in civilian clothing. The court held that an accused could not remain silent, willingly go to trial in prison clothes,
and later claim error.3 5 The court of appeals did not presume that
the defendant's silence indicated willingness; instead it examined
the circumstances surrounding his trial. Defendant's counsel argued
it would have been futile to object due to the trial court's common
practice of trying defendants in prison clothes.3 Thus, Hernandez's
31. 425 U.S. at 505. The Court distinguished cases where the interests of the state outweigh the adverse effects that identifiable prison attire may have on the presumption of
innocence. Such a situation may occur, for example, when safety and administrative efficiency require that disruptive defendants be bound or gagged. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970). See generally Comment, Disruptive Defendants and Prejudice-ProneJurors: Toward
an Implied Waiver of Trial by Jury?, 75 DICK. L. Ray. 572 (1971).
32. See note 26 supra. However, courts in at least one circuit have held that absent a
showing of prejudice, requiring the defendant to appear before a jury in prison garb over his
objection is not a denial of the right to a fair trial. Hall v. Cox, 324 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Va.
1971); McFalls v. Peyton, 270 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 890 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 951 (1969).
33. Courts which have previously used compulsion language have done so where an element of coercion was found to exist, such as where an objection to being tried in prison garb
is overruled. See Gaito v. Brierley, 485 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1973) (defendant himself asked trial
judge to declare mistrial so that new jury could be picked, since some jurors had seen him in
prison attire); Bentley v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1972) (counsel's objection to his client's
appearance in prison garb overruled).
34. 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971).
35. Id. at 637.
36. Id. at 636. This same situation was present in Williams. See 425 U.S. at 531.
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waiver should not be deemed a knowing one. The state contended,
as in the Williams case, that the defendant had appeared in prison
3
clothes as a matter of strategy, seeking to evoke juror sympathy. 1
Upon questioning counsel for defendant, the court found no basis
for this contention and therefore upheld the defendant's due process
3
claim. 1
Although the Supreme Court purported to follow the Hernandez
case, it interpreted Hernandez as requiring objection to trial in
prison garb in order to preserve the constitutional right to be tried
in civilian clothing; 3 finding no objection, the Court concluded the
right could not subsequently be asserted. This is not an inevitable
reading of Hernandez; both the district court and circuit court in
Williams also held Hernandez controlling. Yet these courts found no
waiver. The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether there had been a voluntary waiver, and examined the trial
judge's disposition toward prison attire. Even though the trial
judge's affidavit stated his policy of permitting defendants to appear in civilian clothes,4" the court determined that counsel did not
know of this practice. Furthermore, as in Hernandez, Williams'
counsel felt the request to be tried in civilian clothing would be
denied.4 The district court also rejected the contention of tactical
choice." The circuit court agreed with these findings of the district
court. In effect, the two courts read Hernandez as requiring a knowing waiver, consistent with the past practice in the Fifth Circuit.
The Supreme Court's rejection of this view and injection of a compulsion requirement therefore deserves close examination.
37. The state made a similar contention in Williams. Compare 443 F.2d at 637, with 425
U.S. at 508.
38. 443 F.2d at 637. The Hernandez methodology of inquiring into a voluntary waiver of
the right to be tried in civilian clothing has been consistently applied in the Fifth Circuit.
See, e.g., Goodspeed v. Beto, 460 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1972); Hollins v. Beto, 467 F.2d 951 (5th
Cir. 1972).
39. 425 U.S. at 509. The Court looked to a Fifth Circuit case which explained Hernandez
as requiring the defendant and his attorney "to make known that the defendant desired to
be tried in civilian clothes before the state could be accountable for his being tried in jail
clothes." Id. at 509, citing United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973). In Stahl, however, the defendant was charged with having
murdered another inmate while confined in prison. Thus, the jury would have known of his
incarceration in any event.
40. See 364 F. Supp. at 338.
41. Id.
42. Id. See note 3 supra.
43. See note 38 supra.
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The Court effectively rejected the Hernandez waiver analysis by
shifting from a subjective test of determining whether the defendant, in light of all the circumstances, was unwilling to proceed in
prison garb, to an objective inquiry, reviewing the trial record for
evidence of compulsion. But the defendant's failure to object, for
any reason, not only negated any finding of compulsion but also was
construed as a willingness to proceed in prison garb.44 While other
courts have scrutinized the record to determine whether an element
of compulsion existed, they have not implied a lack of compulsion
from the mere fact the defendant remained silent. 5 Chief Justice
Burger sought to justify this need to show compulsion on the ground
it would preclude defendants from wearing prison clothes as a tactic
to elicit juror sympathy and later claim error.46 Since there are obvious deleterious effects of appearing in prison clothes it seems unlikely that a defendant would intentionally appear before a jury in
such attire absent unusual circumstances. Nonetheless, the result
of Williams is to deny protection to defendants who did not object
to wearing prison clothing although they may have felt forced to
proceed due to the trial climate and custom of the district. While
the compulsion test admittedly prevents appeals by individuals who
choose to wear prison clothes for tactical purposes, it also bars defendants who, despite having counsel, simply lack the knowledge
that they have the right to object to such procedures or believe their
objections would be futile.
Another significant aspect of Williams is the majority's refusal to
subject this alleged due process violation, which the Court conceded
affects the very presumption of innocence upon which our criminal
' This
justice system is based, to an "exacting waiver analysis."47
refusal was predicated on the Court's view that the right to stand
trial in civilian clothing is a trial-type right similar to the privilege
44. See 425 U.S. 512.
45. See note 33 supra.
46. 425 U.S. at 510. The evidence showed that the defendant was in his sixties, that he
felt he had no real case, and that the testimony against him was clear and consistent. Under
these circumstances the Court assumed the tactic was utilized to elicit juror sympathy. Id.
at 510 n.5. Although the Supreme Court contended the tactic was "prevalent," the dissent
pointed out that counsel admitted such a tactic in only one reported case. Id. at 520 n,4
(dissenting opinion). See Garcia v. Beto, 452 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1971) (prison clothes worn to
persuade jury that defendant had drinking problem and did not have the requisite specific
intent to commit the crime).
47. 425 U.S. at 508 n.3. See notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
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to object at trial to the admission of certain evidence." The Court
has long recognized that even fundamental due process rights can
be waived if the waiver takes place knowingly." In Johnson, which
involved the right to be tried with the assistance of counsel, the
Court held that in order to find that the right had been waived there
must be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." 0 Furthermore, the personal participation of the
defendant, not merely the consent of his counsel, is generally required in order to find a knowing waiver.5 ' Not only is personal
participation considered necessary when the right is deemed fundamental, but it might also be required if certain exceptional circumstances are found to exist.5" On the other hand, once a defendant has
counsel and the exercise of a right is labeled as tactical or strategic,
the defendant's counsel may waive those rights and bind the accused by that decision.5 3 It seems certain that had the stringent

Johnson standard been applied in Williams, the Court would have
reached a different result; there was no showing that Williams of his
own volition had intelligently waived his right to stand before the
jury in civilian attire. By characterizing the right as less than
"fundamental," however, the Court could forego applying this standard and permit Williams' conviction in a proceeding that it conceded was something less than a fair trial.
48. 425 U.S. at 508 n.3, citing On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); United States
v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966). In On Lee, the
petitioner attempted to exclude evidence obtained when an undercover agent, wearing a
hidden microphone, engaged in conversation with him and elicited incriminating statements.
Counsel made general objections which were insufficient to preserve the specific claim. The
Court stated that the court of appeals would have been within its discretion in refusing to
consider the point. 343 U.S. at 749 n.3.
49. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (right to trial by jury); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel).
50. 304 U.S. at 464.
51. See Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation,Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CAL&.L. REv. 1262, 1266 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Criminal Waiver].
52. See note 54 infra.
53. See note 54 and accompanying text infra. The Williams Court emphasized the fact
counsel was aware of the prison garb issue. Although a defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel, to allow counsel to make trial decisions such as when to object to leading
questions is not to grant him complete control over the defendant. Placing the disposition of
the defendant's fundamental rights totally in the hands of counsel eliminates consideration
of knowledgable choice by the person who may ultimately lose those rights. See Comment,
Waiver of ConstitutionalRights by Counsel in a CriminalProceeding, 1 J. MAR. J. 93 (1967).
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The Court's waiver analysis is also troubling since there is precedent which supports the view that the waiver of a procedural right
cannot occur without the accused's personal, intelligent waiver,
even when the right involved is characterized as nonfundamental.
5 4 the Supreme Court noted that trial stratIn Henry v. Mississippi,
egy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with the accused
would not, where circumstances were exceptional, constitute a
waiver.5 5 In Brookhart v. Janis,6 the Court held that in determining
whether counsel's strategic decision to forego a constitutional claim
was binding on his client, nonacquiescence by the defendant was an
exceptional circumstance under Henry, therefore rendering counsel's waiver ineffective to bind his client.5 7 Since Williams asked the
prison guard for his civilian clothes, clearly he did not wish to be
tried in prison clothes. This nonacquiescence might therefore have
been deemed an exceptional circumstance preventing a finding of
waiver under a Brookhart analysis. At the very least, it seems a safe
assumption that in light of his earlier request, had Williams known
he had a right to be tried in his civilian clothes, he would not have
acquiesced in his attorney's decision not to object to proceeding in
prison garb.
To eschew an exacting waiver analysis when trial-type rights are
involved makes sense. In many situations counsel must be able to
make decisions independent of his client. When the defendant does
not possess the legal knowledge necessary to understand the ramifications of a particular decision, or when there is not time for con54. 379 U.S. 443 (1965). The defendant in Henry was convicted of disturbing the peace.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court for a determination of whether the
defendant or his counsel had waived the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence by failing
to make a timely objection. The waiver issue was not decided by the Court, but it indicated
that if counsel's strategy in delaying objection to the illegally obtained evidence was an
attempt to deliberately bypass the state procedure, it would amount to a waiver binding on
the defendant unless exceptional circumstances existed. Id. at 451-52. The Court did not
explain what would constitute such exceptional circumstances. Cf. note 57 infra.
55. 379 U.S. at 451.
56. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
57. Id. at 7. In Brookhart, the defendant was convicted of forgery in state court and was
denied the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that
this right had been waived. The United States Supreme Court held that since the defendant
had emphasized in open court that he was not pleading guilty, he did not intelligently waive
his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses even though his counsel agreed to a "prima
facie trial," the practical equivalent of a guilty plea. The "exceptional circumstances" were
the client's desire, as expressed in court, not to plead guilty. As a result, the defendant was
not bound by his counsel's action.
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sultation, it would unduly burden counsel to be required to check
with his client each time he acts." Certainly, when litigation requires counsel to make quick decisions on such topics as evidentiary
objections during trial, the defendant cannot expect to be consulted,
and assuming his attorney is competent, he should be bound by his
attorney's actions. Williams, however, was not such a case. There
was ample time for consultation prior to Williams' trial. Under
these circumstances, the reasons for allowing counsel to bind his
client disappear,59 and personal participation should be required to
find a waiver of constitutional rights.
The majority's departure from the Johnson waiver standard, by
characterizing the right involved in Williams as a trial-type right,
may have a pervasive impact. Although the knowing and intelligent
waiver standard was first espoused in circumstances where the defendant was without counsel, the standard has been extended to
situations where the defendant had counsel. 0 The Williams decision
may make possible the waiver of a wide range of important constitutional rights unless an accused's counsel makes a timely objection.
For example, unconstitutional jury instructions 1 and delays which
violate an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial"2 have been
58. One of the grounds on which courts have justified the binding effect of a nonpersonal
waiver is the theory that the attorney must be in charge of the lawsuit. In addition, there are
many times when a defendant may do more harm than good by attempting to make decisions
in which difficult legal concepts are involved. Finally, during the heat of courtroom battle,
consultation with the defendant would cause delay and distract the jury. See Criminal
Waiver, supra note 51, at 1269.
59. One author has argued:
[The] justifications for the attorney's control-and thus for nonpersonal waiverdo not cover every courtroom situation, however. There would be little loss of either
judicial or advocate efficiency if the defendant were allowed to participate in those
decisions made by the defense at a time when there was a definite opportunity for
consultation between counsel and client.
Criminal Waiver, supra note 51, at 1271.
60. See, e.g., Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (privilege against selfincrimination); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (right to trial by jury); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction).
61. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The Supreme Court, in Mullaney, held
that Maine's rule requiring a defendant charged with murder to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion in order to reduce the charge from murder
to manslaughter violated due process; the burden should be on the prosecution to prove this
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury instruction to the effect that the defendant must
carry this burden was therefore unconstitutional. However, Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger, in which he suggested that failure to object to
such a jury instruction may bar habeas corpus relief. Id. at 704 (concurring opinion).
62. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the prosecution, by obtaining
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considered denials of fundamental procedural rights. Yet, both of
these matters arguably involve strategic and tactical considerations; they therefore might be amenable to a reevaluation by the
Court. These rights, too, may be held to be surrendered without a
knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant. How far the Court
will extend this notion is uncertain. It nonetheless is clear that in
cases where a court does find a waiver of a trial-type right, unless
the defendant can succeed in the difficult task of showing ineffective
assistance of counsel, 3 he is left without a remedy despite the fact
important constitutional rights may have been forfeited in the
course of determining his guilt or innocence.
James A. Prostko
sixteen continuances, delayed the defendant's murder trial until five years after his arrest.
In holding that the defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial, the Court pointed
out that although he did move to dismiss the indictment after the twelfth continuance,
counsel's lack of motion for a speedy trial suggested tht he hoped to take advantage of the
delay. Id. at 535.
63. See Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standardsand Remedies, 41 Mo.
L. REv. 483, 488 (1976), where the author observes that claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are usually dismissed unless the court finds no reasonable justification for the attorney's acts. In at least one case on point, however, a writ of habeas corpus was granted to a
defendant on the ground he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. Among numerous
errors, the defendant's counsel made no objection to his client's appearance before the jury
in prison garb. Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).

